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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the optimal export 
policy in a two-stage game in which a domestic and a foreign firm 
compete in price and R&D investment. Under international Bertrand 
duopoly, an export subsidy directly promotes excess price 
competition, as delineated by Eaton and Grossman (1986). But, in 
the presence of international R&D rivalry, an export subsidy 
indirectly reduces the rival's R&D level, and thereby raises its 
cost. This effect offsets the negative effect of the export 
subsidy resulting in excess price competition. We show that an 
export subsidy (tax) policy is optimal if the relative return to 
R&D is great (small), provided that a government can precommit to 
an ex ante optimal export policy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a gap between the theoretical result of a traditional 
trade policy and the political economy of trade in the real world 
regarding an export policy. That is, it has been shown that an 
export tax should normally be beneficial in perfect competition. 
This is because a large country with a small export tax can 
appreciate its terms of trade. But, in real life an export 
subsidy is common, while an export tax is rare.1 
Brander and Spencer (1985) bridged the gap. They proved that if 
the market structure is a Cournot duopoly, an export subsidy is 
optimal since it raises the profit of the domestic firm at the 
expense of the foreign firm.2 But their model was not robust. 
Eaton and Grossman (1986) proved that an optimal export policy is 
a tax, not a subsidy in the case of a Bertrand duopoly. More 
recently still, this result has been challenged by Carmichel 
(1987). By empirical observation of practices in the real world, 
he pointed out two aspects: First, a subsidy is related to the 
price secured on an export contract, rather than the volume of 
export, i.e., a price subidy, and second, the level of subsidy is 
determined not before, but after an export contract has been 
secured, i.e., an ex post policy decision. The second aspect 
implies that a government cannot ex ante precommit to an optimal 
export policy. Based on these observations, he showed that an 
export subsidy may be optimal when firms are price competitors. 
Although Neary (1991) did not deny Carmichael's interesting 
results, he commented as follows: If a government can precommit 
to its export policy, i.e., an ex ante policy decision, the 
optimal policy is an export tax, as shown by Eaton and Grossman. 
Hence, the social welfare in the ex post policy decision is worse 
— 2 — 




















References 
Brander, J.A., and B. J. Spencer, "Export Subsidies and 
International Market Share Rivalry," Journal of International 
Economics 18 (1985):83-100. 
Carmichael, C. M. , "The Control of Export Credit Subsidies and 
its Welfare consequences," Journal of International Economics 
23 (1987):1-19. 
Dixit, A., "International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic 
Industries," Economic Journal, 94 (1984):1-16. 
Eaton, Jonathan and Gene M. Grossman, "Optimal Trade and 
Industrial Policy under Oligopoly," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 101 (1986):363-406. 
Goldberg, P. K. , "Strategic Export Promotion in the absence of 
Government Precommitment," International Economic Review, 36 
(1995):407-26. 
Itoh, M. , and K. Kiyono, "Welfare-enhancing Export Subsidies," 
Journal of Political Economy, 98 (1987):115-37. 
Leahy, D., and J. P. Neary, "Internatinal R&D Rivalry and 
Industrial Strategy without Government Commitment," Review of 
International Economics 4 (1996):322-38. 
Neary, J. P., "Export Subsidies and Price Competition," in 
Elhanan Helpman and Assaf Razin (eds.), Internat ional Trade and 
Trade Policy, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press, 1991, pp.80-95. 
Spencer, B. J., and J. A. Brander, "International R&D Rivalry and 
Industrial Strategy," Review of Economic Studies 50 (1983):707-
22. 
Qiu, Larry D. , "Optimal Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric 
Information," Journal of Internat ional Economics 36 (1994):333-
54. 
-23-
Notes 
1. In the case of a small country, no type of trade intervention 
can be first best. Itoh and Kiyono (1987) show that an export 
subsidy can be beneficial even in competitive circumstances. This 
is because while an export subsidy directly worsens the terms of 
trade of the subsidized product, it may indirectly improve the 
terms of trade in the markets for related products. 
2. As shown in Dixit (1984), an optimal export policy depends on 
the number of firms in the case of international oligopolistic 
industries. That is, if the domestic country has a large number 
of domestic firms, it will choose to tax the export of its firms. 
3. In other words, the domestic government act as a Stackelberg 
leader vis-a-vis both domestic and foreign firms in setting an 
export subsidy/tax. Also, in this paper we will treat output 
subsidy/tax, but not price subsidy/tax. 
4. The relative return to R&D, originally defined by Leahy and 
Neary (1996), is a measure composed of three parameters as 
follows: The extent of product differentiation, the extent of 
cost reduction, and the R&D cost. Thus, given the extent of 
product differentiation, the greater the extent of cost 
reduction, and/or the smaller the R&D cost, the greater the 
relative return to R&D. 
5. Goldberg (1995), and Leahy and Neary (1996) discuss a similar 
problem to that of Spencer and Brander (1983) without the 
government commitment, assuming Cournot quantity competition. 
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